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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940684-CA 
vs- : 
ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION ANP NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion 
to vacate sentence, dated October 21, 1994, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, presiding. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. When a court continues sentencing without date because a 
convicted defendant has absconded from the jurisdiction and is 
incarcerated in another state, does the court lose jurisdiction 
to sentence the defendant? 
2. Can a defendant successfully claim that his right to a 
speedy trial was violated where he absconds from the jurisdiction 
at the time appointed for his sentencing and, later, appears for 
sentencing without registering any objection with the court about 
the delay? 
Both of these issues present questions of law, reviewed for 
correctness. *[C]orrectness means the appellate court decides 
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the 
trial judge's determination of law.'7 State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE? AND RULES 
Any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 27, 1989, a jury convicted defendant on three counts 
of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, all second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1994) (R. 103-05). Defendant was not sentenced 
immediately because he fled the jurisdiction and was subsequently 
incarcerated, first in California, and then by federal 
immigration authorities in various locations (R. 125). On March 
4, 1994, after defendant's return to Utah, the court sentenced 
him to one to fifteen years in prison for the three 1989 
convictions (R. 242). The court stayed the sentence and placed 
2 
defendant on probation (Id.). 
Subsequently, after defendant was convicted of a third 
degree felony, the court revoked his probation (R. 191, 320) . 
Defendant challenged the revocation in a motion to vacate 
sentence, arguing that the underlying sentence had been illegally 
imposed (R. 170-86). The court denied the motion, resulting in 
this timely appeal (R. 206-11 or addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 27, 1989, a jury convicted defendant on three counts 
of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, all second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (R. 103-05). The court scheduled sentencing for 
August 28, 1989, and referred defendant to AP&P for a presentence 
report (R. 74). Defendant was released on bond (R. 110). 
Defendant's sentencing was continued five times as a result 
of his failure to keep interview appointments with AP&P, motions 
by defense counsel, and failure of defendant and counsel to 
appear for sentencing (R. 112-13, 111, 114-116, 117, 122, 123). 
Finally, at a sentencing hearing on January 16, 1990, the court 
learned that defendant had left Utah, been arrested in California 
for possession and transportation of methamphetamines, and was 
currently incarcerated in California (Defendant's exhibit 6, pp. 
3 
12-13). Accordingly, the court continued defendant's sentencing 
without date and issued a bench warrant for his arrest (R. 125-
26) . 
Upon his release from custody in California in 1992, 
defendant was seized by the United States Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), which incarcerated him in a variety 
of federal penitentiaries pending a determination of whether he 
should be deported (R. 238-40, 272, 274). Eventually, INS 
determined that defendant should be released after completion of 
a drug rehabilitation program. 
On December 17, 1993, Utah placed a detainer on defendant 
pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (R. 124). 
Accordingly, when defendant was released from federal custody in 
January of 1994, he was transferred to Utah, where he faced 
sentencing on the 1989 charges (R. 233). At his sentencing 
hearing, defendant did not object to the court's jurisdiction or 
raise a speedy trial complaint (R. 233-45). After considering 
the rehabilitation program defendant had completed in the federal 
system and the parties' joint recommendation for probation, the 
court sentenced defendant to three concurrent prison terms of one 
to fifteen years, stayed the sentence, and ordered defendant to 
complete 36 months of probation (R. 131, 237, 244). The 
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conditions of probation stated explicitly that defendant was uto 
commit no crimes'' (R. 137, 244) . 
Several months later, defendant was arrested by the Utah 
Highway Patrol for evading a police officer, possession of 
cocaine, and several vehicle-related violations (R. 141-42). At 
the ensuing hearing on an order to show cause to determine if 
defendant's probation should be revoked, defendant, now 
represented by new counsel, moved to vacate his sentence. He 
alleged that the length of delay between conviction and 
sentencing had divested the trial court of jurisdiction and, 
thus, that his original sentence was illegal. Consequently, the 
subsequent grant of probation, he claimed, was also illegally 
imposed (R. 170-86). After briefing and a hearing on the matter, 
the trial court denied the motion, lifted the stay on defendant's 
sentence, and reinstated the original sentence (R. 204, 206-10). 
This timely appeal followed (R. 221-22). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that by continuing his sentence without 
date and by failing to file a detainer on defendant while he was 
incarcerated in California, the trial court lost jurisdiction. 
First, the court continued defendant's sentencing without date 
because defendant, while free on bail, fled the jurisdiction. 
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Defendant has cited no persuasive legal authority for the bizarre 
proposition that, by fleeing Utah and committing crimes 
elsewhere, a defendant can divest the Utah court of jurisdiction 
and so escape punishment for crimes of which he had been found 
guilty. And, second, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
places no affirmative duty on a state to file a detainer at any 
time. Thus, defendant's contention that the trial court lost 
jurisdiction by failing to lodge a detainer while defendant was 
incarcerated in California is also groundless. 
Defendant also argues that the delay in sentencing violated 
his right to a speedy trial, resulting in a loss of jurisdiction 
for the trial court. This argument fails for a variety of 
reasons. First, defendant cannot even claim the protection of 
the speedy trial guarantee because he voluntarily absented 
himself from the jurisdiction. Second, because defendant himself 
caused the delay, his actions constituted a temporary waiver of 
the right to a speedy trial. Third, even if he could claim a 
violation, it would not result in a loss of jurisdiction. By 
appearing in court without registering any objection, defendant 
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. And finally, 




WHEN A CONVICTED DEFENDANT, OUT ON BAIL AND 
AWAITING SENTENCING, CHOOSES TO LEAVE THE 
STATE AND IS SUBSEQUENTLY INCARCERATED 
ELSEWHERE, THE UTAH COURT DOES NOT LOSE 
JURISDICTION EITHER BY CONTINUING THE 
SENTENCING PROCEEDING WITHOUT DATE OR BY 
FILING A DETAINER SHORTLY BEFORE DEFENDANT IS 
DUE TO BE RELEASED 
The crux of defendant's argument is that by continuing his 
sentencing without date and by failing to file a detainer on 
defendant while he was incarcerated in California, the trial 
court lost jurisdiction over his case (Br. of App. at 7). 
The first prong of defendant's argument is that, by 
continuing the sentencing without date when it discovered that 
defendant was incarcerated in California, the trial court 
abdicated control over the case and thereby lost jurisdiction. 
For this proposition, defendant cites language from In re Flint. 
71 P. 531 (Utah 1903). The facts of that case, however, reveal 
that defendant's reliance is misplaced. In ElinL, defendant came 
before the trial court, which indefinitely suspended his sentence 
and released him on his own recognizance. At that point, 
defendant was discharged from custody. Some eleven months later, 
responding to a motion by the district attorney, the court called 
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defendant into court and sentenced him to a year in prison. 
Flint. 71 P. at 531. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the 
trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence defendant. Id. 
at 531-32. In essence, by indefinitely suspending defendant's 
sentence and discharging him from custody, the trial court closed 
the case and terminated its jurisdiction over the defendant. 
The Flint decision was proper and has no impact on the 
instant case. In Flint. the trial court, in effect, made a final 
disposition of the case; here, the trial court reserved 
sentencing until such time as it could properly dispose of the 
case. To equate the trial court in Flint indefinitely suspending 
sentence and discharging defendant from custody with the trial 
court here continuing defendant's sentence without date in 
response to defendant's flight overlooks the fundamental 
difference between the cases. In Flint, the trial court in 
essence said, "I am through with this case." Here, the trial 
court said, "I cannot now be through with this case because the 
defendant's illegal acts have temporarily prevented final 
disposition." Defendant has offered no persuasive authority for 
his dubious argument that a defendant may divest the court of 
jurisdiction by illegally fleeing to another state. 
The case much closer to the facts here is State v. Saxton, 
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519 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974). In Saxton. defendant was convicted at 
trial and subsequently failed to appear for sentencing. 
Incarcerated in another state, he was eventually returned to Utah 
for sentencing, Saxton argued that because he had been free on 
his own recognizance while his sentencing was pending and 
because, in his absence, sentencing was indefinitely postponed, 
the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 
1341. The Supreme Court rejected defendant's Elint-based 
argument, stating that the statutory time for imposing sentence 
may be extended for a variety of reasons and that, nthe defendant 
certainly cannot absent himself and prevent the imposition of 
sentence until after that time has expired, and then take 
advantage of his own wrong by insisting that the court is without 
jurisdiction to impose the proper sentence." Id. at 1342. 
Saxton, then, exposes defendant's disingenuous premise — that by 
fleeing Utah and committing crimes elsewhere, a defendant can 
divest the Utah court of jurisdiction and thus escape punishment 
in Utah for crimes of which he had been found guilty. 
The second prong of defendant's argument is that the Utah 
court lost jurisdiction over him by failing to lodge a detainer 
against him while he was incarcerated in California. 
By lodging a detainer, a state notifies the prison 
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authorities in another state that someone in their prison system 
faces charges pending in another jurisdiction. State v. 
Stilling. 770 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989). The purpose behind the 
IAD is to encourage the speedy disposition of outstanding charges 
*so that any uncertainty about the prisoner's status will be 
dispelled, and rehabilitation and treatment can proceed 
unhindered." Dodson v. Cooper, 705 P.2d 500, 502 (Colo. 1985), 
cert, denied. 474 U.S. 1084 (1986)(citations omitted). The IAD 
is designed to benefit both prisoners and the state lodging the 
detainer: 
The IAD benefits prisoners by providing them 
with a uniform procedure to obtain an 
expeditious and orderly disposition of 
charges upon which outstanding detainers are 
based. The IAD benefits party states by 
establishing a system of cooperative measures 
that allow the disposition of charges pending 
in one state against a prisoner incarcerated 
in another. 
Stilling, 770 p.2d at 137. 
Defendant, by placing an affirmative duty on Utah to file a 
detainer as soon as possible, is in essence arguing that he had a 
right to be returned to Utah on a detainer before being turned 
over to federal immigration authorities.1 The IAD, however, 
1
 The self-interest inherent in defendant's position is 
clear. Knowing that the INS was after him, defendant surely 
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neither saddles the State with such an obligation nor bestows on 
defendant such a right. The explicit statutory language provides 
only that the IAD is triggered after a detainer has been filed 
against a prisoner. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995), IAD art. 
Ill(a); United States v. Mauro. 436 U.S. 340, 343-44 (1978). 
"Lodging a detainer is an informal process; it neither requires 
the state lodging a detainer ('the receiving state') to pursue 
custody nor requires the state in which the prisoner is 
incarcerated ('the sending state') to do any act or effect any 
transfer of the prisoner." Stilling, 770 P.2d at 137 (footnotes 
omitted). Nowhere in the IAD is the State given the affirmative 
duty to seek custody of a prisoner at all, let alone seek custody 
as soon as a state realizes that an individual is incarcerated 
elsewhere. Thus, defendant's contention that the court lost 
jurisdiction by failing to lodge a detainer against him while he 
was incarcerated in California is wholly without merit. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS PRECLUDE HIS CLAIM THAT 
HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; IN 
ANY EVENT, AN EXAMINATION ON THE MERITS 
DEMONSTRATES THAT THEY WERE NOT VIOLATED 
would have preferred facing charges in Utah rather than the 
possibility of being deported back to Cuba. 
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To some extent, defendant seems to be arguing that the trial 
court, by delaying the proceedings, violated defendant's right to 
a speedy trial.2 The remedy for this presumed violation, assumes 
defendant, is a loss of jurisdiction for the trial court.3 See 
Br. of App. at 17. This argument depends on two false 
assumptions: first, that defendant here can claim the protection 
of the speedy trial right; and, second, that violation of the 
right results in a loss of jurisdiction. Both of these matters 
were resolved by the trial court: 
1. Defendant was absent from his sentencing 
in January 1990 because he was incarcerated 
in California. However, defendant 
voluntarily left Utah pending his sentencing. 
He voluntarily traveled to California. He 
committed new criminal acts in California. 
His arrest and incarceration in California 
were a consequence of his voluntary acts. 
Therefore, Defendant's failure to appear for 
sentencing in Utah was voluntary. 
2. Defendant cannot divest this Court of 
2
 Defendant fails to articulate the federal constitutional, 
state constitutional, or statutory basis for this claim. 
3
 Sentencing is encompassed in the right to a speedy trial, 
as defendant asserts. See State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 
(Utah 1986) ("A speedy trial necessarily contemplates not only a 
seasonal trial of the facts, but also a seasonal decision and 
sentencing following trial"); see fllSP Gonzales v. State. 582 
P.2d 630, 632-33 (Alaska 1978) (explaining in detail the 
rationale for including sentencing in the right to a speedy 
trial). 
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jurisdiction to sentence him by voluntarily 
absenting himself from the jurisdiction of 
this Court prior to imposition of sentence. 
R. 208-10 or addendum A. 
For the proposition that the first conclusion is incorrect 
as a matter of law, defendant cites State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam). In Houtz, defendant fled the 
jurisdiction prior to trial, committed crimes elsewhere and was 
incarcerated in another state. The court first determined that 
defendant had voluntarily absented himself from trial by leaving 
Utah in violation of his bail. It then tried and convicted 
defendant in absentia. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. Defendant relies 
on this case for the statement that *[w]hen a defendant is in 
custody, he is not free to make a voluntary decision about 
whether or not he will attend the proceedings." Id. What 
defendant ignores, however, is the Court's holding -- that "the 
court abused its discretion by not continuing the trial so that 
defendant's attendance could be arranged." Id. That is, the 
basis for the reversal in Houtz -- that the trial court should 
have continued the proceedings --is precisely what the trial 
court did here.4 
4
 Certainly, had the court sentenced defendant in absentia, 
he would have argued on appeal that his absence required the 
13 
Defendant should not be permitted to benefit from his 
unlawful act of fleeing the jurisdiction prior to sentencing. In 
this case, defendant knew that he had been found guilty and was 
going to be sentenced. Indeed, but for his non-appearances and 
the motions for continuance filed by his counsel, he would have 
been sentenced in 1989. And, clearly, it was defendant's 
responsibility to stay in contact with the court. State v. 
Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah App. 1989)(citation omitted), 
cert, denied. 802 P.2d 774 (1990). Failing in this 
responsibility, he cannot now benefit by claiming that his 
absence from court was involuntary: 
To hold otherwise would allow a 
"mischievously inclined defendant to profit 
by his own wrongdoing and would be unfair to 
those individuals accused of crime who are 
not inclined to abscond, because the courts 
would tend to revoke bail and hold all 
defendants in custody to assure their 
presence at all times during the trial." 
i£L (citing State v. Myers. 508 P.2d 41, 42 (Utah 1973)). 
Furthermore, because defendant himself caused the delay, his 
actions constituted a temporary waiver of his right to a speedy 
trial. State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982) 
court to vacate his sentence, arguing, again, that Houtz 
controlled. 
14 
(construing statute that protected prisoner's constitutional 
right to a "speedy trial by requiring 90-day disposition after 
notice) . in " ^lascr^ez, the v_u; ? 
purpose" •: f the sta1 ,.;ie was- prevent those charged wi" \ 
i-"r 1 i oi cem- „ i over the hci. a 
prisoner undisposed of charges against him." Id. (citation 
omitted) However, when it, is the prisoner himself who causes 
the delay, lxbe i ridi mt os 11 11-1 
this protection; tru . . ;;se behind the statute thus no longer 
exits ] rhe court, thei i, logically 
concluded that u:*w ^ a. ^ inou. apposition time should be 1- ,heiit,-,il 
by the period of time caused by defendant's delay Plainly, the 
Defendant's second false as:
 r-_on is chat, even if he 
could claim,, a, violation of hi s right to a speedy trial, such, a 
violation- would cause the COUXL LU ± 
Defendant, by appearing ' -; -'. rnou- registering any 
ob]e , , , l i'lii I11 .in11,111 .ispt'Cl i i' r" HjeeiliiiyM'! i mbm LLL ed hiiiise.lt |-o 
t h e c o u r t ' s i u r i s a i c K . _ _s v . D i s t r i c t Cc^^. ^ w
 WUdh 
2 4 5 , 264 , i Tf"a}l 1 Q K ^ (genera l appearance wa I von 
objection to jurisdiction over * 
From, a practical standpoint defendant did so because it was 
in his best interest. A colloquy between the court and his trial 
attorney at the hearing on the motion to vacate sentence reveals 
that defendant believed the court's recommendation of probation 
obviated the need for any argument or objection: 
Court: Was there any discussion at the %94 
sentencing about whether or not at the 
time between *90, when I issued the 
bench warrant, and when I actually 
sentenced in '94 , that that had -- that 
delay was unacceptable, or problems? 
Anything said in this courtroom 
regarding that? 
Counsel Not that I recall. 
Court But there was discussions between Mr. 
Leyva and you on that subject? 
Counsel That's true, 
Court As I understand, he apparently decided 
because probation was recommended, and I 
believe I indicated to you that that 
looked reasonable --
Counsel: Yeah, that seemed to resolve it 
Court That resolved the issue? 
Counsel Seemed to, yes, 
R. 262-63 
It was thus in defendant's best interest to submit to the 
court's jurisdiction. By appearing in Utah without objection, 
defendant received probation and the opportunity to be a free 
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man, once and for ail. He cannot now come into cuun --a * 
submitted to the court's jurisdiction without objection,, received 
1 I in I > e n e f 1 I i 11 \' i > > I 11 11 > 1 1 , 11111II I 11< 11 i i 1111m 111 I I » i I I 1 1 1 I 11 *• 1 1 • 1 11111 e ,i. 
and be h e a r d t complain t h a t t h e g r a n t of p r o b a t i o n a s w e l l a s 
t h e s e n t e n c e u n d e r l y i n g i t were i l l e g a l l y imposed . 
Even i f d e f e n d a n t were en t i f l e i l l in pr< I 11 rpepdy 1 1  1 ill 
c la im i n t h i s C o u r t , 2 t woi 1] d fa :i ] on t h e m e r i t s . D e f e n d a n t ' s 
c l a i n: 1 :i s j : i: oper ] 5 ai lal y zec i 1  :i 1 1 ::ie:i : I::l ie four pa r t: 1: a l a n c i n g t e s t s e t 
f o r t h i n B a r k e r vy WjngQ, ^ , « . « . ^^ v i972) . Ai^ul i l £Latfi.JLi. 
Haf e n . 593 P. 2d 538 (Utah : 9 ^ - ^ - " e v . T r a f n y . 799 K 2d ' 704 
(Utal 1 3 9:90) rill: i 1 1 II - re-
p r o s e c u t i o n and t h e d e f e n d a n t a^ i t may ha- c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e 
d e l a y
 t ..^ _ _. f a c t o r s : t h e l e n g t h <~: . . . a ^ a y ; +"h« 
r e a s o n f o r tiAe Uu i t t > r , une d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of m e x - -• \ 
speedy t r i a l ; and t h e p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t c a u s e d by t h e 
de l a/j - S k a t e J1U-L dl I Lfc., ' - " I' ""I ill il h 1 I I my Ba ike r v. Wingo. 
407 U S. a t 53 0) 
First, the 1 eng th of the delay between the finding of guilt 
in 1989 and the sentencing in 1994 is certainly ] ong enoi igl 1 
raise speedy trial concerns. See Banks ~r~ ~.2d at 1385-8t 
( e j q h t e e n muni!; Ii c 11»1 \\ 1 ini wi -i MMI runiiii'i . . ,^ion 
sufficient to 1 aise speedy trial concerns) . 
"•7 
Second, the reason for the delay must be analyzed. Between 
July of 1989 and January of 1990, all delays were caused by 
defendant's failure to keep appointments with AP&P, the failure 
of defendant or his counsel to appear for sentencing, or motions 
for continuances filed by defense counsel (R. Ill, 112-13, 114-
16, 117, 122, 123). From January of 1990 until March of 1994, 
the delay was attributable to defendant's leaving the 
jurisdiction and subsequently possessing and transporting 
methamphetamines in California, the illegal acts leading directly 
to his incarceration in California. To attribute this delay to a 
failure on the part of the State to vigorously secure defendant's 
presence ignores the primary fact that, but for defendant's act 
of absconding from the jurisdiction while he was out on bail, he 
would have been sentenced on January 16, 1990. Cf. State v. 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116 (when a prisoner acts to delay trial, 
he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a 
speedy trial); State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 
1986) (same). 
The third factor examined under the Barker v. Wingo 
balancing test is whether defendant asserted his right to a 
speedy trial. The only relevant record evidence is a statement 
by Bud Ellett, then employed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
18 
O f f i c e , t h a t he i t " - " 
d e f e n d a n t and tha t !.e r e s p o n d e d t y a s s e r t i n g t h a t d e t a i n e r s or. 
seij|i"iii. innj wi'ii mil lii'pi U[JI idL v 1,1 J'lj.; u4i Notably , when 
defendant was eventually released from federal
 custod"y and 
returned *:~ TTt^u *— uis sentencing, he did not asser4 tl r/ " 
const 
06) As the "trial; court • observed, "Didn't say a word to me at 
the time of sentenci ng. He was as happy as a clam that he was 
put on probation. Basicall^ reople that don't show up for 
sentencing qz *• ~ prison" sh :Ur.N 
importantly, '.he balancing test requires a.. anu*}&*s wi whether 
the delay resulted in any prejudice to the* defendan4". State v. 
Banks. 720 P.2d 1386. Defendant 
^prejudicial and needless years of imprisonment in federal 
i ^ inging h i m 
back to Utah for sentencing (Br. of App. at 19). This assertion 
is clearly without merit Whether or at what point T^-r- n-j-- -1
 ( 
detainer against defendant had nothinq ,it .ill IP il-i wilh 
In any event" the State had not yet lodged, a detainer 
against defendant. Thus, defendant's action preceded -he State's 
request and so would not have server :nv:Vp the Agreement's 
protections. See IAD arfc TT'T'-"'. 
i 
defendant's questionable immigration status or with the INS's 
handling of his case.6 Indeed, far from causing prejudice, the 
delay in sentencing served as a windfall for defendant. The 
trial court explained: 
The lawyer was here. The client didn't show 
up, and the reason he didn't show up is he 
had left the state and had gone to California 
and committed a crime for which he was being 
incarcerated, but anyway, he didn't show up 
for sentencing. I suppose at that point in 
time one of the options would have been to 
sentence him absentia [sic], a non-appearing 
defendant. I suppose we could do that, too, 
but I think you know what happens to people 
that are sentenced when they're not here. 
The maximum sentence is imposed. That means 
that a person will not have an opportunity 
for probation like happened in this case. 
R. 303. Thus, precisely because defendant had served time in the 
federal system and had successfully completed a drug 
rehabilitation program, the court agreed to adopt the parties' 
recommendation that defendant be placed on parole and not serve 
any prison time at all (R. 304) . Had defendant not violated his 
probation, he would have remained a free man and would certainly 
never have claimed that his right to a speedy trial had been 
6
 With regard to sentences imposed by two different 
sovereigns, the law presumes that the sentences should run 
consecutively. State v. Reed, 709 P.2d 391 (Utah 1985) 
(construing Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401). 
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violated. 
Defendant's significant contribution to the delay, evidenced 
the complete lack of prejudice to him resulting from that self-
induced delay, compels the conclusion that he was not den i ed his 
right to speedy trial. The nidi cc ' • 
effect, correct as a matter .r id i;e affix-tie. ; - or 
addeiicjtiin 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Cour4- ~1 ^ affirm the trial 
court1 " n oirlri rli'iiy i 1111 defendant 's 
ORAL I ,: _ N OPINION 
l;.«i .. tate r equests faotl 1 oral argument and a written opinion 
in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this [ f) day of September >. 
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On September 30, 1994, th tei came jjeioxe this Court 
for an evident- -carina o" „^ ._uw-ant's motion t-o varatP hi<= 
sentence. It. is represented b\ 
S« ...._.-. . .
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Defendant presentee i lesses, . Deland 
, »*. j . o w JL n 
October 
v i d e * 
Oi 
rrr.tinued until 
e aty^ve inscribed 
submitted written iiniiin tanda. Having heaid Llie Evidence, iiaving 
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Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 27, 1990, defendant was convicted of three 
counts of Distribution of a Controlled Substance. Each was a 
second degree felony. 
2. Following the verdict, this Court set a sentencing 
date. That date was continued several times either at the 
request of defendant's trial counsel, Loni Deland, or because 
defendant did not appear at the date set. Eventually, the 
sentencing date was set for January 16, 1990 
3. Sometime after the jury verdict defendant voluntarily 
left Utah and went to California. While there, defendant was 
arrested on other charges and incarcerated. 
4. On January 16, 1990, the defendant did not appear. 
This Court was informed that defendant did not appear because he 
was incarcerated on other charges in California. This Court 
continued sentencing without date pending defendant's return. 
5. The State initially did not file a detainer with 
California correction authorities. 
6. Defendant filed a 180 day disposition notice. No 
action was taken on the 180 day notice because the Salt Lake 
County Attorney1s Office determined the Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
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were only awaiting sentencing. 
/ . AJLthougn XJL • defendant - a t t o r n e y 
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i^-oortar icv * te fendan . v e n r u a l i y 
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voluntarily traveled to California. He committed new criminal 
acts in California. His arrest and incarceration in California 
were a consequence of his voluntary acts. Therefore, Defendant's 
failure to appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary. 
2. This Court is not convinced that a criminal defendant 
has the right to a speedy sentencing. However, if such a right 
exists the four factors articulated for considering a violation 
for the right to speedy trial apply. These factors are, the 
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant. 
However, defendant has failed to make a sufficient showing that 
these factors warrant a finding of denial of any right defendant 
may have to a speedy sentencing. Although the delay between the 
verdict and the sentence was considerable, it was caused by 
defendant's failure to appear for sentencing or else his counsels 
request for continuances and then by defendant leaving Utah and 
committing other criminal offenses in California. Defendant did 
not assert any right to a speedy sentencing. Defendant was not 
prejudiced by any delay in his sentencing. 
3. Defendant's request for disposition of untried case 
within 180 days as provided by UCA 77-29-1 was not an assertion 
of defendant's right to speeding sentencing. 
000209 
